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I. Introduction
The current Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations includes a major
effort by the industrialized countries especially to bring the protection of intellectual
property rights under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). The purpose of doing this would primarily be to extend such protection to
countries that currently provide it only weakly or not at all, particularly certain developing
countries. This paper will explore one aspect of the economics of this issue, emphasizing in
particular the possible adverse welfare effects that would be created by extending
intellectual property protection to all countries of the world.
As is well known, a primary reason for providing patent protection is to permit
inventors to earn a return on their inventions, and therefore to provide an incentive for
technology to advance. The cost of providing patent protection, however, is that it permits
the patent holder to exercise monopoly power over the market for the new product, and
thus prevents the benefits of the new product from being enjoyed optimally by consumers.
It is for this reason, some have argued, that patent protection is granted for only a limited
time, so as to achieve a desirable balance between incentives to invent and gains to
consumers from products after they have been invented.1 I will argue that the same
sort of trade-off may also justify limiting patent protection geographically, as well as over
time.
iSee Nordhaus (1969) and Scherer (1980).
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Such a geographical limitation on the coverage of patents is most likely to be
desirable when inventive activity is concentrated in one part of the globe, while the benefits
from inventions can be enjoyed equally by consumers worldwide. To make the point, I will
therefore focus on a particular very simple theoretical model of inventions and patents that
has these properties in extreme form.
In the context of this model, I will show first that the tradeoff between incentives to
invent and the subsequent enjoyment of inventions does justify the use of patent
protection, at least in the country where invention occurs. Thus the principal motive most
often discussed for extending patent protection around the world is indeed present in my
model. However, I will then show that extending this protection to other countries is very
likely to be harmful to them, in spite of the fact that they will benefit from increased
inventive activity. In those circumstances, if the world as a whole does gain from
extending patent protection, it is only in the inventing countries that these gains are
experienced, and in fact they gain even more than the world as a whole because they gain
at the rest of the world's expense.
Finally, I show that it is even possible for the world as a whole to lose from
extending patent protection, and that such a loss must occur, in the context of my model,
as the coverage of patent protection is extended to the entire world. Thus a case can be
made, in terms of world welfare, for limiting the coverage of patent protection to less than
the entire world.
I recognize that the model in which I demonstrate this result is far from general,
and that there are many considerations that are absent from the model that could
undermine it. I will discuss several of these in the concluding section. Nor would I argue
by any means that the efforts underway in the Uruguay Round are misguided. I do not
doubt that a good case can be made for extending patent and other intellectual property
rights into a number of countries where they currently do not exist, or are only laxly
enforced. However, the case for universal patent protection is not a clear one, as my
A[
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analysis demonstrates, and the concerns of some developing countries that they will be
exploited by patent protection are not without foundation.
II. An Economic Analysis of Patent Rights
A Single Invention in a Single Country
Consider first the case of a single invention. At a research cost of R, an inventor
has designed a new product that can be produced by anyone at a constant marginal
production cost of c. Individual consumers have a demand for the new product that is
described by their inverse demand function,
p = a- bq (1)
With n identical consumers, the inverse market demand function is
p = a - (b/n)q (2)
which is graphed in Figure 1 as the curve DD.
Competitive Production
Suppose first that the inventor is not granted a patent. Then anyone at all will be
able to produce the new good, and a perfectly competitive market price equal to the
marginal cost, c, will be established. The competitive output will be
c a-c (3)
and consumers will earn a surplus of
= 0  [a-(b/n)q-c]dq (4)
_ n (a-c)2
2 b
There will be no monopoly profits earned on the invention, and the inventor will have lost
entirely the cost of research, R. Nonetheless, given that the product has already been
invented, this competitive outcome is also optimal in the sense of maximizing joint
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consumer and producer welfare, and the consumer surplus in equation (4) is therefore
superscripted with an "o" for optimal.
Monopolized Production
Now suppose instead that a patent is granted to the inventor. The inventor will now
be able to charge a monopoly price that maximizes the monopoly profit on production,
7= (p - c)q (5)
where p is given by the market demand function, (2). It is seen that, because demand is
linear and marginal cost is constant, the monopoly output will be exactly half of the
competitive output,
(6)
m 1 a-cq =n
with a monopoly price half way between cost c and the demand parameter a,
m.1(ac)(7)






As noted here and as illustrated in Figure 1, monopoly pricing in this linear case extracts
exactly half of the optimal consumer surplus in the form of monopoly profit.






that is only one quarter of what they would have obtained with perfect competition. The
benefit to society as a whole of having the invention produced by a monopoly includes both
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the monopoly profit and the consumer surplus, and is therefore three quarters of the
benefit that would have acrued under competition:
b mo(10)bm= ,m +sm 3 su
4
Therefore, there is a dead-weight loss of one quarter of the optimal consumer surplus that
is attributable to monopoly pricing.
This is illustrated in Figure 1, where the demand curve DD and the constant
marginal cost c give rise to a competitive (and optimal) output of qc at a price pc = c. A
patent that grants monopoly power to the patent holder cuts output in half, raises price,
and creates a deadweight loss that is labeled L. However the advantage of the patent is
also indicated in that the patent holder now earns the monopoly profit r which then
provides some return on the cost of the invention.
Unfortunately, even this return may not be enough to compensate the inventor for a
worthwhile invention. If we now consider the ex ante problem of whether the invention
was worthwhile, it is clear that the invention would have been worth the cost to society as
long as the optimal consumer surplus, s°, were to exceed the cost of research, R. Since
only half of s°, 7, accrues to the patent holder, one would expect that some worthwhile
inventions will not be created, even when there is patent protection. Patents are therefore
an imperfect method of fostering invention, both because they lead to monopoly distortions
of consumer choice, and because they fail to foster all worthwhile inventions. This latter
point will be made more clearly if we now consider multiple inventions and bring the choice
of the level of invention explicitly into the analysis.
Multiple Inventions in a Single Country
The case of multiple inventions will be most tractable if we consider a continuum of
them and hence abstract from the indivisibility of individual inventions and the
discontinuities that this would imply. As long as the actual number of inventions is large,
this simplification will not matter appreciably for the results.
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Suppose then that inventions are indexed by nonnegative real numbers, z. Let a(z),
b(z), c(z), and R(z) be the demand and cost parameters for invention z, as in the analysis
above. Then let s°(z) be the optimal consumer surplus corresponding to invention z, as in




Without loss of generality, let inventions be ordered so that
(12)
z1 > z2 => s°(z1)ss°(z2)
Because of the assumed linearity of demand and cost, this ordering of inventions by
optimal consumer surplus will also be the ordering by monopoly profit, and therefore the
inventions that will be undertaken will always be those with the lowest indices, z, up to
some cutoff point.
I will measure the level of invention by its research cost. Hence if all inventions
from z = 0 to some z = Z are invented, then the total cost of invention, I, will be
I(A) = J R(z)dz (13)
Since dI(z)/dz = R(z) > 0, the function I(-) is monotonic and can be inverted. I therefore
re-express the optimal consumer surplus in terms of I:
0 0 -1(14)
s (I) = s[I
From (12) and (13), s°(I) is also weakly monotonically decreasing in I. What it represents
is the optimal consumer surplus per dollar of research obtainable from the marginal dollar
of research, given that I dollars have already been spent on all inventions yielding a
greater surplus per dollar.
From the earlier analysis of a single invention, it follows that various properties of a
monopoly equilibrium can also be calculated from s0(I). In particular,
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m(I).=.l50( (15)
is the monopoly profit, per dollar of research, from the marginal invention, and
S1 ms(I) = s"(16)
is the consumer surplus, per dollar of research, from the marginal invention given that
production is monopolized.
From their derivation, it is clear that these functions ought actually to be step
functions, declining discontinuously at each level of I that completes the full research cost,
R(z), of the marginal invention. For simplicity, however, I will assume that the number of
inventions is large, so that these function can be approximated as continuous. Further,
and much more restrictively, I will also assume that these functions are linear,
represented by
(17)
s0(I) = n(f - gI)
where f,g> 0 are parameters of this linear function and n, as before, is the number of
consumers in the country.
Population is included here explicitly in order to facilitate analysis of the two-country
case below. It appears multiplicatively because of its role in (4). Note, therefore, that f-gI
is the optimal consumer surplus per dollar of research for a representative consumer and
that, from (4), f=[a(z)-c(z)] 2/2b(z) for z=0, the highest priority invention. The slope
parameter g indicates the rapidity with which diminishing returns to invention set in. The
level of invention I = f/g represents the total research cost of all available inventions
whose products would be demanded at all if competitively priced and thus provides an
upper bound on the level of invention that will actually take place.
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Competitive Invention
I can now examine the equilibrium levels of invention and welfare under various
scenarios. The competitive case is simplest, because nothing happens. Without patent
protection, the level of invention will be zero in this model, since there will be no way for
any inventor to recover the cost of research. Levels of total consumer surplus, Sc, and
monopoly profit, I1c, will also be zero:
c Sc c =0 (18)
Optimal Invention
The optimal level of invention, 1O, will include all inventions that yield an optimal
consumer surplus greater than their cost of research, and hence whose optimal consumer
surplus per dollar is greater than 1. Thus, from (17),
1o =s-1 nf-1
I o (1) ng (19)ng
Since the optimal consumer surplus is obtainable only if products are competitively priced,
the monopoly profits corresponding to this optimal level of invention must be zero:
(20)
110=0
The total consumer surplus obtained in this optimal situation will then be found by adding
across all inventions the optimal consumer surplus per dollar, multiplied by the research
cost of each invention. With the assumed continuity of the surplus function, so, this
addition is accomplished by integration:
50 = jJs*(IdI
-1 (21)




Finally, the net gain to society from this optimal level of invention is the sum of the
consumer and producer gains (the latter being zero in this case), minus the research cost,
I°, of the inventions:
N° = SD+ Ho - Io





If inventors are protected with patents, then production will take place under
conditions of monopoly, as discussed above. The level of invention will be that which
equates the monopoly profit from the marginal invention to its research cost, or in other
words equates the monopoly profit per dollar to unity. Thus
Im =m~ 1 (1)=so (2 )_nf-2 (23)
ng
The level of monopoly profit is obtained by integrating the profit function from (15) and
(17),
pmI0




while the level of consumer surplus is obtained by integrating (16):
Sm Ifm SOId





Summing (24) and (25) and subtracting (23), the net gain to society from invention in the
patent-protected, monopoly situation is
Nm = gm + m _ 1m
_(nf)2 - 4 (nf)2 - 4 nf-2
8ng 4ng ng
_ (nf - 2)(3nf - 2)
8ng
These results are illustrated in Figure 2. The uppermost curve represents the
optimal consumer surplus per dollar cost of research, and is drawn as the straight line
n(f- gI). Its intersection with the horizontal line at 1 indicates the socially optimal level of
invention, so long as goods once invented are also produced optimally. The total consumer
surplus generated by this level of invention is the area under the so(I) curve between I=0
and I=Io. The net gain to society however is smaller by the cost of research, and is
therefore given by the area of the triangle under So(I) and above 1.
As was found from the analysis of a single invention, the monopoly profits, 7rm, and
the consumer surplus in the presence of monopoly, sm, are one-half and one-quarter,
respectively, of so. These are therefore also drawn in Figure 2 as straight lines, starting
from correspondingly lower intercepts and ending at the same level of invention I. Since
monopolists earn only 'm per dollar of research, patent rights will foster invention only up
to the point where these monopoly profits equal one dollar. Thus the level of invention
with patent protection is shown as Im
With this construction, the total profits from all inventions up to Im are given by the
area under 7rm, shown in Figure 2 as the sum of areas HTj, IT, and II. Consumer
surplus is the area under sm between 0 and Im, which is equal to Ilf, but is shown
separately by first adding together 7rm and sm in the line sm+rm( 3 /4 )so. Consumer
surplus is then the area Sm, below this lin~e and above 7rm. The total net benefit to society
due to inventions up to Im is the sum of consumer surplus and profit, minus the cost of
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research. Since the latter is the area of the rectangle under the horizontal line at 1, this
net benefit is simply the shaded area, Sm+ 1.
Comparing this to the larger triangle of optimal social benefit from invention, there
is a dead-weight loss of areas L 1 +L 2 +L 3 . Area L 1 represents the loss of consumer
surplus due to monopoly pricing of products that are invented. Area L2+L 3 , on the other
hand, represents the consumer surplus that is foregone because less than the optimal
amount of invention takes place, even when inventors are granted monopoly patent rights.
The total dead-weight loss is calculated from (22) and (26) as2
No-Nm = (nf - 1)2 _ (nf - 2)(3nf - 2)2ng 8ng (27)
nf2
8g
Multiple Inventions in Two Countries
Suppose now that there are two countries, A and B. All invention takes place in
country A, but once a good has been invented the technology is known and it can be
produced in either country, subject of course to any limitations imposed legally by patent
rights. Consumers in the two countries have identical individual demand functions for all
goods. Populations (numbers of consumers) in the two countries are nA and nB
respectively. It will be convenient to define
A B (28)
n=n +n
2It is intriguing- though not at all important, as far as I can see- that this expression
turns out to be so simple. Noting that nf and f/g are the vertical and horizontal intercepts
of the so line in Figure 2, this expression for net loss is exactly one quarter of the area of
the triangle formed by su and the two axes. Since srn+ rm =(3/4)sO, this means that the
awkwardly shaped area L+ L2 +L 3 is actually equal to the triangle between sm+'rm and
s". This implies that the area L3is equal to the area K1 +K 2 , a result that can also be
shown using the traditional tools of plane geometry. The proof, which I leave to interested
readers or their high-school-age children, uses the fact that the vertical line above Im is
broken into four equal segments by the lines that cross it.
12
and to express results in terms of n and the fraction of the world's population that is in
country A:
na
7Y = n (29)
As before, let (1) represent the common individual inverse demand functions for a
particular good, so that the market inverse demand functions in each country are
p = a - (b/nJ)q , J = A,B (30)
With marginal cost, c, of producing the good common to both countries, the optimal
consumer surplus for the good in country J is
J 2oJ- n (a-c)s =2~ b (31)
n s
where s is the optimal per capita consumer surplus for the good.
As before, let inventions be ordered by decreasing values of s/R, and assume that
these values can be expressed as a linear function of I. That is,
s(I) = f - gI (32)
is the optimal per capita consumer surplus per dollar of research for the marginal
invention, given that I dollars have been spent inventing all goods of equal or greater s/R.
The relevant values of consumer surplus and monopoly profits for the two countries can
then also be expressed in terms of the linear function:
oJ33)
s (I) - nJ(f - gI) , J=A,B
is the total optimal consumer surplus per research dollar in country J = A,B due to the
marginal invention at level of invention I (and would be received by consumers in country
J if the good were competitively priced there).
Once again exploiting the linearity of demand, properties of the monopoly equilibria
can be found as well:
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I 1J s(I) (34)2
= n (f - gI) , J=A,B
is the monopoly profit per dollar of research to be obtained by selling the product of the
marginal invention in country J at the monopoly price. Similarly,
5mJ 1o
s (I) = 1Ts (I) (35)
= 1nJ (f - gI) , J =A,B
is the consumer surplus per dollar received by consumers in country J from the marginal
invention if they pay the monopoly price.
It is now possible to calculate the totals of consumer surplus and monopoly profit for
different patent protection regimes by first using (34) to identify the level of invention that
will take place, and then integrating these various functions. The two regimes I will
consider are "restricted patent protection," in which patent protection is provided only in
country A, and "extended patent protection," in which protection is extended to country B
as well.
Restricted Patent Protection
With patent protection only in country A, monopoly profits will be earned only there,
and invention will take place up to the point that
A r (36)7rA (I r) = 1 (6
Using (34) and (29) it follows that
r _ ynf-2 . (37)
'yng
Integrating (35) up to this level of invention and using (29), the level of total consumer
surplus in country A may be found as
SrA = ftr 1A (f-.gIdI (8
_ 72 n2 f2 -_4
8'ng
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Monopoly profits are made only in country A, and thus may be found by integrating (34)
for country A alone. Since (34) is just twice (35), profits are found immediately as twice
(38):
Ifr 1 rA= nf -4
IrI -r _I 2nI24 4(39)
4yng
Finally, because patent protection is limited to country A, consumers in country B have
access to a competitive supply of all invented goods. Their total consumer surplus is
therefore obtained by integrating (33) for country B:
SrB = jr nB (f-gI)dI
(40)
_ (1--y)(y2 n2f 2 - 4)
2'y2ng
The net gain to all residents of country A, including their monopoly inventors, is
their consumer surplus plus their monopoly profit, minus the cost of invention. Using (37),
(38), and (39),
NrA = SrA + 1 r _ r
_ (ynf - 2)(3'ynf - 2) (41)
8ng
The net gain to all residents of country B includes only their consumer surplus, NrB _
SrB, in (40). Together these give the net gain for the world as a whole as
NrW = NrA + NrB
S(ynf-2)[y(3nf- 2) + 4(1-)(ynf+2)] (42)
8Y2
8ng
All of this is illustrated in Figure 3, which replicates Figure 2 for country A in the
top panel and for country B, upside down, in the bottom panel. With monopoly profits
earned only in country A, invention takes place up to Ir, where the marginal per-dollar
profit in country A, 7rA, intersects the horizontal line at 1. Gross profits are then the area
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A
under vr , or u 1 +u 2 +u 3 . Consumer surplus in country A is area u1 . Since the cost of
invention, Ir, is the area u 1 +u 2 , the net gain for country A is u1 +u 3 .
Meanwhile, consumers in country B get a free ride, receiving the optimal, or
competitive, consumer surplus equal to area v1 +v 2 +V 3 .
Extended Patent Protection
If patent protection is now extended to country B as well as country A, then an
invention once patented in country A will also entitle the inventor to monopoly profits in
country B as well.3 With potential investors knowing this, invention in country A will
take place up to the point that the total profits from the two sources from the marginal
invention just covers the cost of research. Thus
rA(e) + xBe) =1 (43)
Using (34) this can be solved to yield:
enf -2 (44)
ng
As before, the totals of consumer surplus and monopoly profits in the two countries
can be found by integrating (34) and (35) up to Ie. In country A this gives








_ y(n2f2 - 4)
4ng
3It is not necessary, of course, that the inventor also be the producer in country B. The
inventor can licence someone else to produce there and can extract the monopoly profit by
setting the licence fee at an appropriate level.
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where 1 eA is now only a portion of the total profits.
In country B the inventors from country A also earn monopoly profits equal to
II eB _ nIB(f-gI)dI
2 (47)
_ (1- 7)(n2f 2 - 4)
4ng
Consumers in country B now get only the reduced consumer surplus of the monopoly case:
SeB _ I (f-gI)dI
4 (48)
_ (1- 7 )(n
2 f 2 - 4)
8ng
Total profit is
If = HeA + HIeB (49)
n2 f 2 - 4
4ng
which is the same expression found in the single country case in (24), since the monopolist
inventors are now treating the world as essentially a single market. The net gain to
country A is found from (44), (45), and (49):
NeA = SeA + IIe -Ie
onf - 2 (50)8nf -22+7)(nf+2) - 8]
8g
Finally, the net gain to country B is again just its gain in consumer surplus,
NeB SeB (51)
The net benefit to the world is therefore
NeW -NeA +NeB
(3nf- 2)(nf- 2) (52)
8ng
To illustrate these results in Figure 3, the rnarginal profit earned in country B, irB,
is first added to Ar in the top panel. The level of invention with extended patent
w
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protection, Ie, is then found where this new line crosses the horizontal line at 1. In
country A, consumer surplus expands to include u5 , while profits now include u5 +u 6
earned on sales in country A as well as u4 + u7 +u 8 on sales to country B. Deducting the
research cost, Ie, the net benefit to country A is u 1 +u 3 + u4 +u 5 +u 8 .
Consumers in country B now earn only the monopoly consumer surplus under smB
for all goods up to Ie. Thus their total benefit is now v 1 +v 4 .
Comparison of Restricted and Extended Regimes
It is clear from Figure 3 that residents of country A gain unambiguously from
extending patent protection to country B. Consumers in A get consumer surplus from the
additional goods that are invented, as shown by the area u5 . The monopolist inventors in
country A also gain the even larger area u4 , which is the monopoly profit on sales to
country B of goods they would have invented anyway, plus u8 , the excess monopoly profits
in both markets on the additional inventions. Formally, the gain to country A from
extending patent protection is found from (41) and (50) to be
(53)
NeA NrA _ 2(1-)[ 2f2 - 2 ( 1 -(5)]
8yng
As long as
Af> 2  (54)-nf~nf
so that Ir in (37) is positive, (53) is also positive, verifying the gain to country A.
Residents of country B, on the other hand, are likely to lose. The monopoly pricing
of the goods they were previously getting competitively causes them to lose three quarters
of the optimal consumer surplus on those goods. In Figure 3 this loss is area v2 +v 3 . In
return for this they do get consumer surplus on the new goods whose invention is
stimulated by the extended protection, but even on these they only get the monopoly
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consumer surplus, shown as v4 in Figure 3. If v2 +v 3 is greater than v4 , as drawn in the
figure, they lose.
Formally, the change in welfare for country B is found from (40) and (48) as
NeB - NrB = _ (1- [372n2f2 + 4(,2-4)] (55)
8y ng
If 'ynf is only slightly greater than required in (54), this will be negative regardless of the
value of y alone. That is,
f = nAf > 1= 2.31 (56)
is sufficient for (55) to be negative. Alternatively, as long as the fraction of the world's
population that is located in the innovating country, y, is sufficiently large, then country B
will lose. If
2 162 > 16(57)
4 + 3n2 f 2
then (55) will also be negative.
Clearly, much depends on the size of the two populations, together with the
parameter f. The latter represents the intercept of the optimal consumer surplus function,
and hence the per capita consumer surplus optimally obtainable from the highest priority
invention, per dollar cost of research needed for that invention. Condition (54) merely
requires that this highest priority invention yield a total benefit to the population of
country A that is twice its cost. Likewise, condition (55) implies that if the per dollar
benefit from the highest priority invention for the world, nf, is, say, ten times its cost
(nf = 10) , then country B will be hurt by extending patent protection if the share of world
population in country A is greater than only 16/3 04 =5.3%. Thus it seems quite likely
that (55) will indeed be negative under plausible circumstances.
Turning finally to effects on the world as a whole, these can be observed in Figure 3
by first noting that areas ug and v3 are equal, so that part of the gain to country A
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cancels directly with part of the loss to country B. This leaves the net effect on the two
countries together as u 5 +u 8 +v 4 -v 2. As drawn in Figure 3, it appears that the three
areas of gain are together larger than the single area of loss, v2 , and that the world gains
here from extending patent protection.
This is not inevitable, however, as Figure 4 shows. There the relevant portions of
Figure 3 are reproduced, but the proportions are changed. As a result, the three areas of
gain from extended patent protection, shown as the shaded areas u5, u8 , and v4 , are much
smaller than in Figure 3, while the area of loss, the cross-hatched area v3 , is larger. As
drawn, the latter area is larger than the former, and the case drawn is therefore one in
which extended patent protection lowers welfare of the world as a whole.
How do Figures 3 and 4 differ? In drawing Figure 4, I attempted to capture what
would happen if population were shifted from country B to country A, thus expanding all
of the amounts of surplus and profit in country A and contracting them in country B. By
doing this, the level of invention in the restricted protection equilibrium is made larger,
since inventors in A have a larger protected market, and at the same time the scope for
expanding invention still further by extending protection is reduced.
To check that this is a correct interpretation, consider the more formal expression
for the gain to the world from extending protection. From (42) and (52),
NeW - NrW - 1- [16 - 47 - n2 f 2 2 ] (58)
87 ng
The sign of this depends on the expression in brackets. Setting that expression equal to
zero for y=1, it follows that if
(59)
nf > fi2 = 3.46
then (58) will be negative for 7 sufficiently close to 1. I will assume from here on that (59)
is indeed satisfied; that is, that the most desirable invention would yield a surplus for
world consumers at least three and a half times its cost.
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Under that assumption, then the world as a whole loses from extended patent
protection once the portion of the world already covered by patent protection is sufficiently
large. In particular, it cannot be optimal from a world welfare standpoint for patent
protection to be extended to the entire world.
IH. Conclusions and Qualifications
I have now shown what I set out to show: that under specified circumstances it is
not optimal to extend patent protection to all countries of the world. The reason for this
result is implicit in the analysis. Patent protection has the offsetting effects of, on the one
hand, permitting inventors to earn monopoly profits on their inventions and thus
stimulating inventive activity and, on the other hand, distorting consumer choice by
monopoly pricing. If all innovation originates in one part of the world, then extending
patent protection to a broader and broader area does have these two effects, but there are
dimishing returns to the first of them. That is, as more and more of the world is already
covered by patent protection, the extra market that can be covered and hence the extra
invention that can be stimulated by extending patent protection still further becomes
smaller. Thus at some point the costs due to extending monopoly pricing to existing
inventions come to outweigh the benefits of generating new ones.
Many assumptions are explicit, and others implicit, in this analysis, and the results
depend to varying degrees upon all of them. Let me conclude by suggesting my own
judgements as to the importance of some of these assumptions for the main result.
Location of Invention
First, it is not crucial to world welfare, though it may be to the individual countries,
that no invention take place in country B. If inventors in both countries had a chance of
creating the inventions of the model, then some of the monopoly profits that I have had
accruing to country A would accrue instead to inventors in country B. With free trade,
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however, the same levels of invention would take place in equilibrium, and levels of world
welfare would be the same.
Identical Demands
On the other hand, it is crucial that per capita demands for invented goods be the
same, or at least similar, in both countries. If they are not-if some inventions would be
demanded more in country B than in country A-then an important benefit to extending
patent protection to B is missing from the model. Patent protection in country B will
stimulate precisely those inventions that are of particular importance to B's population,
and thus will yield a greater benefit to B than to A. This possibility would therefore
increase the net gain to both country B and the world as a whole of extended patent
protection.
Linearity
The analysis here has been greatly facilitated by assuming that demands for goods
were linear and that the function relating optimal surplus to the level of invention was
linear as well. Linearity of demands seems of comparatively minor importance: what
really matters is that there be some welfare loss due to monopoly pricing, and this would
be the case for a wide variety of demand functions.
Linearity of the surplus function is a bit more critical, as is seen in Figure 3, for
example. If the curves were not linear, then there would be the possibility that they
would, say, turn sharply downward just to the right of Ir. In that case, there would be
very little additional invention stimulated by extending patent protection, and the case
against it would be strengthened. In contrast, if the curves were to flatten out just to the
right of Ir, then Ie might be pushed to a much higher level, and the benefits to extending
patent protection would be increased. Thus the cases for and against extending protection
can be materially altered by the curvature and position of these curves. On the other
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hand, in the absence of any information about what these curves do in fact look like, the
linear case seems to be about as neutral as one could hope for.
Transmission of Information
I have assumed here that once an invention is discovered, the information about how
to produce it is freely available worldwide. This is important, since otherwise production
could not take place at all in country B in the absence of patent protection, and the main
source of loss due to extending protection, both for country B and for the world as a whole,
would be removed. It is of course true that information about many new inventions is not
costlessly transmitted abroad, and that extending patent protection may therefore be
beneficial to the extent that it stimulates the transfer of technology. On the other hand,
the demands for protection on the part of innovating firms in the U.S. and other advanced
countries make it clear that in at least some industries information about new products is
diffusing without patent protection much more readily than they would like.
I am sure that many other objections to this model can and will be raised as
discussion proceeds. It may well be that extending patent protection to a larger part of the
world is in fact in the interest of the world as a whole, and perhaps even in the interests of
some of the developing countries who are currently resisting such a change. All I have
tried to establish is the intellectual legitimacy of the position that worldwide patent
protection may not be desirable. I am inclined to believe, on the basis of this model, that
at least the very poorest of countries should be exempted from any new agreement that is
made to extend patent protection under the GATT.
23
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